

A broader consideration of indexing thresholds

“Good tax policy is often compromised by the combination of the passage of time and an unindexed threshold”

When the idea of indexing thresholds in the tax legislation is discussed, it is often considered only in terms of “bracket creep”, that slow and insidious increase in the income tax taken from individuals due to the marginal income tax thresholds not being indexed.

However, while bracket creep is a prominent example of the adverse consequences that can arise from unindexed thresholds, there are many other examples in our tax system of unindexed thresholds that are arguably even more objectionable. While there are arguments against indexing individual marginal tax thresholds, there is often no valid reason for the other thresholds in the tax system to remain unindexed.

The fundamental problem that arises from unindexed thresholds is that the purpose for the existence of these thresholds is lost over time as a direct result of the threshold being unindexed.

Many of these unindexed threshold exist to simplify the tax system. Some thresholds operate to ensure that only certain, often larger and more complex taxpayers, need to consider parts of the taxation legislation. Some thresholds exist to ensure that small issues can be ignored as they would be uneconomical to address. However, as they are unindexed, more and more taxpayers, and more and more transactions, fall above the threshold each year, meaning the complexity and administration burden applies to a large percentage of taxpayers or transactions, not due to a conscious decision of the policy drafters, but merely due to inflation.

This is obviously inappropriate.

Unfortunately, in most cases not indexing a threshold was not a positive choice made by those implementing the policy. Rather, the unindexed nature of the threshold occurred due to those involved in the development of the legislation not appropriately considering the value of money changes over time due to inflation, and so the economic value of the unindexed threshold changes over time as well.

This paper considers the complexity that arise from unindexed thresholds, and how to fix them.

It goes both ways...

There are unindexed thresholds in the tax system that affect certain concessions such that these concessions have slowly become irrelevant over time. There are unindexed thresholds in anti-avoidance provisions meaning that these anti-avoidance provisions hardly serve any purpose now.

Therefore, these unindexed thresholds both increase (for example limiting concessions) and decrease (for example limiting anti avoidance measures) the revenue collection. However, in both situations, it is likely that this was a mere oversight.

The following examples show two unindexed thresholds, one limiting the effectiveness of an anti-avoidance provision over time (example 1), and another limiting the effectiveness of a concession over time (example 2).

Example 1: The ever-decreasing applicability of the non-commercial losses rules

The non-commercial losses rules in Division 35 began on 1 July 2000¹. The stated purpose for Division 35 was to stop significant revenue leakage from individual taxpayers claiming deductions for unprofitable activities which were 'often unlikely to ever be profitable'².

In Division 35 there are a series of exemptions to the operation of these rules, such that these rules do not apply if:

- The amount of assessable income derived by the individual from the relevant business activity for an income year is at least \$20,000³.
- The activity has produced a tax profit in 3 out of the past 5 years⁴.
- The individual uses real property, or an interest in real property, on a continuing basis in the relevant business activity, that has a value of at least \$500,000⁵.
- The individual uses certain other assets, on a continuing basis in the relevant business activity, that have a total value of at least \$100,000⁶.

Almost 25 years later, these three dollar-based thresholds in Division 35 remain at the same amount they were set to in 2000, making falling into these exceptions substantially easier than they were in 2000. The fact that these thresholds are not indexed will lead to these exemptions applying to more taxpayers each year, making this anti-avoidance provision less useful each year.

¹ New Business Tax System (Integrity Measures) Act 2000

² Recommendation 7.5 of the Ralph Committee's report, "Review of Business Taxation: A Tax System Redesigned" 1999

³ Section 35-30

⁴ Section 35-35

⁵ Section 35-40

⁶ Section 35-45

Under section 35-40, Division 35 does not apply if there is \$500,000 of real property used in the business. Estimates range within types and locations of properties but estimates of the increase in property prices from 2000 to today are around 300% to 450%. Taking a mid-range⁷, in 2000 dollars this \$500,000 threshold is now the equivalent of \$133,333. In 2000, if a taxpayer was unable to offset the losses from their hobby farm against their other income because the land they were using in the farm was only worth \$150,000 in value, then today that same land would be worth well over \$500,000 and the taxpayer could offset these losses against their other income.

The unindexed threshold is compromising the underlying policy of the exemption, and of the entire anti-avoidance provision.

Example 2: The lost exemption for small amounts of eligible income of minors

Division 6AA⁸ is an anti-avoidance provision that applies the highest marginal tax rate to certain income of minors to prevent the practice of parents funneling income to their children. All the income of a minor is covered by the operation of this provision, and then various exclusions apply to certain types of income. However, as there is no exemption for various passive income sources (for example interest) but, as it is accepted that a minor may have a small bank account or have some limited investments, there is a threshold amount of this type of passive income that a minor can derive without the penalty taxation rates under Division 6AA applying.

The threshold of the amount of non-excepted assessable income a minor can derive without Division 6AA applying to \$416. This rate first applied on 1 July 1983⁹ and this \$416 rate has remained to today.

Inflation over the more than 40 years that this rate has been at \$416 is approaching 300%, meaning that the threshold rate, valued at 1983 dollars now sits at \$106.

The policy of allowing an amount of passive income to be derived by minors without an effective penalty tax applying has not changed over the last 40 years but as the threshold set back in 1983 has not been indexed, the policy has been substantially compromised.

Unindexed thresholds in the tax system need a systematic and thorough review as they, over time, compromise the underlying purpose of the legislation in which they sit.

Even where there are substantive reasons that a threshold should not, or practically cannot, be indexed, it is still important that the effect that the unindexed threshold is having on achieving policy outcomes is regularly considered.

⁷ 375% increase in property from 2000 to 2024

⁸ Of the ITAA36

⁹ Income Tax (Rates) Amendment Act (No 2) 1983

Sometimes remembered, often forgotten...

While certain thresholds are unindexed, they are irregularly given one-off increases to reflect the fact that, being unindexed, the underlying policy for the existence of the threshold is being compromised by inflation.

While this is a preferable outcome to thresholds that are both unindexed and never increased, this “one-off indexing” is capricious and random, often only occurring once the detriment to the underlying policy has reached an inappropriate level. These thresholds are often only given this one-off increase when they become a political issue, rather than as a result of a review of the effect the unindexed threshold is having on the policy behind the threshold.

Examples of thresholds that have had this “one-off indexing”, but have then been forgotten, include:

Example 3: Reportable fringe benefits complexity returns

In 2000, Reportable Fringe Benefits Amounts (RFBAs) were first required to be calculated and included in employee’s payment summaries¹⁰. These amounts are used to determine a taxpayer’s liability for various levies and tax surcharges and other income related obligations.

As small RFBAs would have negligible effects on these liabilities, and it is a substantial administrative burden on employers to undertake these calculations and report the amount, a threshold was set so that if the RFBAs for any employee is \$1,000 or less it need not be reported.

In 2006, the Government announced that, to “reduce compliance costs for business and relieve employers from some FBT obligation”¹¹, they would increase the reportable fringe benefits amount threshold from \$1,000 to \$2,000¹².

The amount has remained at \$2,000 since that change, even though CPI inflation has increased by over 60% since 2006.

This threshold should have been increased to \$3,000 many years ago. However, this has not occurred, not due to any consideration of the fact that the compliance costs achieved in 2006 should not be continued, but rather due to this threshold being overlooked.

¹⁰ PART IIA Division 3 of the FBTAA86

¹¹ “Government Introduces Further Improvement to the Tax System”, Peter Dutton MP, Media Release, 17 August 2006 – at <https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/peter-dutton-2006/media-releases/government-introduces-further-improvement-tax-system>

¹² Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No. 5) Bill 2006

Example 4: CGT maximum net assets test gets smaller and smaller every year

To claim any of the small business CGT concessions, a taxpayer needs to comply with certain basic conditions¹³ and one of these basic conditions is that the taxpayer is either a CGT small business entity¹⁴ or satisfies the maximum net asset value test. The maximum net asset test threshold is designed to ensure that these concessions only apply to small businesses.

After many years of this threshold being at \$5 million, in 2007 it increased to \$6 million¹⁵.

If this amount had been indexed to CPI in 2007 it would now approach \$10 million.

However, this has not occurred, probably not due to any consideration of the fact that these concessions should now only be available to businesses with relatively smaller levels of assets, but rather due to this threshold being overlooked.

Example 5: GST registration threshold

In the second reading speech by the then Treasurer, the Hon Peter Costello, of the Act introducing the GST, he stated:

Very small businesses with a turnover less than \$50,000 per year and non-profit organisations with a turnover of less than \$100,000 a year will not have to register (but may choose to do so).

Seven years later these (from 1 July 2007) thresholds were increased by 50% to \$75,000 and \$150,000 respectively. This amendment was described as a “part of a package of measures to assist small business and reduce compliance costs”, and providing “smaller entities and non-profit bodies with the choice either of being unregistered and free from GST obligations or of registering voluntarily and benefiting from the reporting concessions provided to voluntary registrants.”

There have been numerous calls to increase these thresholds, as recently as September 2025 in Board of Taxation consultation on GST reforms¹⁶, which concluded:

An increase in the current GST registration threshold would remove many small businesses from the system and thereby might reduce compliance burden and integrity risks.

If these thresholds had been indexed to CPI they would now be around \$120,000 and \$240,000 respectively.

¹³ Outlined in Subdivision 152A of the ITAA97.

¹⁴ Carrying on a business and under \$2 million turnover – Subdivision 328-A ITAA 97

¹⁵ Tax Laws Amendment (Small Business) Act 2007

¹⁶ “The Board’s Bulletin”, September 2025, at <https://taxboard.gov.au/sites/taxboard.gov.au/files/2025-09/board-bulletin-202509.pdf>

Review unindexed thresholds

There should be a review of every threshold in the tax laws that is not indexed, considering whether the unindexed threshold should be indexed. The review should also consider both the most appropriate way to index the threshold, and the most appropriate indexation factor (both discussed below).

However, the most effective way to identify these unindexed thresholds would be to open a consultation process whereby taxpayers and their tax practitioners can identify unindexed thresholds that they believe should be indexed so that the underlying policy behind the threshold is protected.

Once these unindexed thresholds are identified, the threshold should be assessed to establish if the fact that the threshold is not indexed compromises the original purpose of the legislature in implementing the threshold.

Recommendation 1

That the Treasury undertake consultation and a review of all thresholds in the tax legislation that are not indexed, considering the underlying purpose of the threshold and considering if that purpose is being compromised as a result of the threshold being unindexed. If the purpose is being compromised by the unindexed threshold, the threshold should be indexed.

Finding the right method...

Once it is established what thresholds should be indexed, it is then important to establish what method of indexation should be used. There are different methods used to index different thresholds in the tax system. When considering various different indexed thresholds, it becomes obvious that different methods are used to index these thresholds.

For example, Table 1 shows the luxury car tax threshold for the previous 4 years:

Financial year	Fuel-efficient vehicles	Other vehicles
2026-27	\$91,661	\$80,809
2025-26	\$91,387	\$80,567
2024-25	\$91,387	\$80,567
2023-24	\$89,332	\$76,950
2022-23	\$84,916	\$71,849
2021-22	\$79,659	\$69,152

Table 1: luxury car tax threshold

Table 2 shows the general transfer balance cap for various years:

Financial year	Fuel-efficient vehicles
2026-27	\$2,100,000
2025-26	\$2,000,000
2024-25	\$1,900,000
2023-24	\$1,900,000
2022-23	\$1,700,000
2021-22	\$1,700,000

Table 2: General transfer balance cap

Ask a practitioner what the general transfer balance cap is, and they will be able to tell you the precise amount. Ask a practitioner what the luxury car tax threshold is and, even if they have looked at it recently regarding the FBT exemption of EVs¹⁷, they will need to look it up again.

Merely on the grounds of simplicity, there is merit in having thresholds that are rounded to allow easier comprehension and recall. Any loss or gain to the equity or efficiency of the

¹⁷ Section 8A of the FBTAA86

threshold caused by such rounding should be seen as a trade-off for the simplicity of a rounded threshold.

The preferred method for indexation

The method of indexation used in relation to the General Transfer Balance Cap in table 2 is found in subdivision 960-M¹⁸. Subsection 960-285(2) states:

You index the amount by:

*(a) first, multiplying its base amount mentioned in subsection (3) by its *indexation factor mentioned in subsection (5); and*

*(b) next, rounding the result in paragraph (a) down to the nearest multiple of its *rounding amount.*

Rounding amounts are set for various thresholds at either \$2,500, \$5,000 or \$100,000 depending on the size of the threshold¹⁹. The Subdivision has two examples of how this is applied.

Example 1:

An amount of \$140,000 is to be indexed, with a rounding amount of \$5,000. If the indexation factor increases this to an indexed amount of \$143,000, the indexed amount is rounded back down to \$140,000.

Example 2:

An amount of \$140,000 is to be indexed, with a rounding amount of \$5,000. If the indexation factor increases this to an indexed amount of \$146,000, the indexed amount is rounded down to \$145,000.

Indexation factors are rounded to 3 decimal places (rounding up if the fourth decimal place is 5 or more) and set using an indexation factor recorded for the quarter ending on 31 December just before the start of the relevant income year.

Concepts for indexing rounded caps			
Item	Column 1 Item in section 960-265	Column 2 Index number	Column 3 Rounding amount
1	Items 8, 10, 11 and 12	the *index number mentioned in subsection 960-280(4) (which is about average weekly ordinary time earnings)	\$5,000
2	Item 9 (concessional contributions cap)	the *index number mentioned in subsection 960-280(4) (which is about average weekly ordinary time earnings)	\$2,500
3	Item 10A (general transfer balance cap)	the *index number mentioned in subsection 960-280(1) (which is about the CPI)	\$100,000

¹⁸ Of the ITAA97

¹⁹ Subsection 960-285(7)

Table 3: Table in subsection 960-285(7) of the ITAA97

This method should be used for all indexed thresholds. Subdivision 960-M currently only allows for indexation to increase by steps of \$2,500, \$5,000 or \$100,000 depending on the size of the threshold. Treasury should consider what is the appropriate increase step for each threshold that is indexed or is to be indexed under the earlier recommendations.

Given the breadth of thresholds, there will almost certainly need to be other steps by which thresholds can increase. For example, the \$6 million maximum net asset test in Division 152 of the ITAA97 may increase only in \$1 million steps while the \$300 minor benefit exemption may increase only in \$100 steps.

Recommendation 2

That the Treasury undertakes a review of the different methods used for indexation of thresholds in the tax legislation and consider what is the most appropriate method of indexation. This indexation method should then be applied across all indexed thresholds.
--

Finding the right rate...

Irrespective of the method used to index a threshold, an indexation rate is required. It is important that the appropriate indexation rate is used to best reflect the policy underpinning the threshold it is indexing.

In the tax system, different thresholds are indexed using different indexation rates. For example, some thresholds are indexed by “*All Groups Consumer Price Index number (being the weighted average of the 8 capital cities) first published by the Australian Statistician for the quarter*”²⁰, and some are indexed by “*full-time adult average weekly ordinary time earnings for the middle month of the quarter first published by the Australian Statistician in respect of that month*”²¹.

Choosing the wrong indexation factor, or one that inappropriately interacts with other thresholds, can lead to inappropriate outcomes and can undermine the intended policy.

Example 5: Two LCT Thresholds with different indexation factors

There are two Luxury Car Tax thresholds, one applying to fuel-efficient luxury cars, and the second applying to all other luxury cars (see Table 1 above). Until March 2025²² each was indexed using a different indexation factor, with the fuel-efficient car limit indexed using the motor vehicle purchase sub-group of the CPI, and all other luxury cars indexed using the All-Groups CPI.

This arose as the threshold for fuel-efficient luxury cars was introduced in 2008 while the threshold for all other luxury cars was set in 2000.

These two indexation factors changed at different rates, and in the last 17 years the differential between these two thresholds has narrowed dramatically, by more than half, substantially undermining the policy of having a luxury car tax threshold for fuel-efficient luxury cars applying at a higher threshold.

Financial year	Fuel-efficient vehicles (FEV)	Other vehicles (OV)	% FEV above OV
2008	\$75,000	\$57,180	31.1%
2025	\$91,378	\$80,567	13.4%

TABLE 4: LUXURY CAR TAX THRESHOLDS 2008 AND 2025

If this was not fixed, a time would come where the thresholds could reverse, such that fuel-efficient threshold would fall below the other vehicle threshold.

²⁰ For example, subsection 960-280(1) of the ITAA97

²¹ For example, subsection 960-280(4) of the ITAA97

²² Treasury Laws Amendment (Tax Incentives and Integrity) Act 2025 amended the indexation factor so that both luxury car tax thresholds are indexed by the motor vehicle purchase sub-group of the CPI.

Example 6: Indexing HECS loans decreases serviceability²³

Until 2024²⁴, the indexation of HELP loans was done using CPI. In the Australian Universities Accord - Final Report²⁵, this indexation rate, which had been used for decades, was reviewed and it was found that this indexation rate was inappropriate. The report found that using CPI, rather than the Wage Price Index (WPI), created a “perverse outcome where HELP debts are growing just as relative ability to service debts is declining.” The use of an inappropriate indexation factor meant that indexation, which was intended to maintain the real value of the loan, was actually increasing the real value of the loan in relation to debt serviceability.

Interestingly, the indexation factor chosen to index HELP debts is the lower of indexation factors. There may be thresholds where a combination of indexation factors may be a more appropriate indexation factor.

The Parliamentary Budget Office in a 2023 report identifies eight different indexation factors that are currently used to index government expenditure programs²⁶.

Recommendation 3

That the Treasury undertake a review of current indexed thresholds, and any additional thresholds that are to be indexed as recommended in Recommendation 3 above and consider what is the most appropriate indexation factor for each threshold.

²³ This is not indexing a threshold, but indexing an amount, but the example demonstrates what effect an inappropriate indexation factor can have.

²⁴ Universities Accord (Student Support and Other Measures) Act 2024 amended the indexation of HELP so that indexation is done using the lower of CPI or WPI as the indexation factor.

²⁵ “Australian Universities Accord Final Report”, Department of Education 25 February 2024 – at <https://www.education.gov.au/australian-universities-accord/resources/final-report>

²⁶ “Indexation & the budget – an introduction”, PBO 2023 - Appendix A of <https://www.pbo.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-05/Indexation%20%26%20the%20budget%20-%20an%20introduction.pdf>

Considering bracket creep

“Just because our public finances mean we cannot solve bracket creep today, does not mean we forget about it. We need to keep it front of mind so when the opportunities arise to fix it, we can act”

While this paper argues for a broader consideration of unindexed thresholds than just considering the individual marginal income tax thresholds, it remains important to consider these widely discussed unindexed thresholds. There has been much analysis of and many criticisms of the fact that the unindexed nature of the individual marginal income tax thresholds leads to higher average tax rates for individual taxpayers as their wages or other sources of income increase over time.

This discussion paper does not consider the nature of bracket creep caused by these unindexed thresholds²⁷. However, it is important to understand why, in light of the continued criticism of bracket creep and international comparisons to countries that have indexed their individual tax thresholds²⁸, Australia’s individual marginal income tax thresholds have not been indexed.

Structural deficit


The additional revenue collected by bracket creep has played, and continues to play, a significant role in managing government debt. For decades, governments have faced a trade-off between returning bracket creep and allowing bracket creep to reduce debt. At a time of a structural deficit in Australia’s public finances, consideration of the additional debt that would arise if these thresholds were indexed needs to be considered before making any change to these thresholds.

Without bracket creep, the Parliamentary Budget Office has modeled that there will be no improvement in the budget’s underlying cash balance in the medium term.

²⁷ The Parliamentary Budget Office undertook a detailed analysis of bracket creep and its economic effects on 29 September 2021 in its report titled “Bracket creep and its fiscal impact - Budget Explainer No. 1” - https://www.apb.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/Publications/Budget_explainers/Bracket_creep

²⁸ Twenty-nine countries have some form of indexation of individual income tax thresholds, and of these thirteen have annual threshold indexation - Beer, Sebastian, Mark Griffiths, And Alexander Klemm. 2023. “Tax distortions from inflation: What are they and how to deal with them?” IMF Working Papers 23/18. For example, the United States introduced automatic indexation of its federal income tax system via the Economic Recovery Tax Act 1981 and each year, the Internal Revenue Service adjusts the income tax brackets in line with changes in the CPI. Canada has had similar provisions since 1973.

FIGURE 1: PROJECTED UNDERLYING CASH BALANCE, WITH AND WITHOUT LIMITING BRACKET CREEP, 2023-24 TO 2035-36



Source: "2025-26 Medium-Term Budget Outlook: Beyond The Budget", Parliamentary Budget Office, September 2025

If we decide not to index the marginal tax thresholds...


If, as the Parliamentary Budget Office analysis suggests²⁹, is not possible to index the individual marginal tax thresholds due to the current budgetary condition faced by the Australian government, then we need to consider the effect of the one-off returns of bracket creep that has occurred.

Since the 1990s, much of the increase in revenue the government has received in bracket creep has been returned by specific policy decisions to reduce tax rates, reduce tax thresholds, or to introduce offsets³⁰. Figure 3 shows the average rate of tax has been relatively stable at between 22 and 25 per cent for most of the past forty years due to this periodic return of bracket creep.

²⁹ : "Bracket creep and its fiscal impact - Budget Explainer No. 1", Parliamentary Budget Office, 29 September 2021 – at https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/Publications/Budget_explainers/Bracket_creep

³⁰ For example, the now repealed Low and Middle Income Tax Offset

FIGURE 3: AGGREGATE AVERAGE PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATE, 1960-61 TO 2035-36



Source: "2025-26 Medium-Term Budget Outlook: Beyond The Budget", Parliamentary Budget Office, September 2025

If we accept that the only fiscally responsible way to return the additional revenue raised by bracket creep is to use one-off returns to taxpayers, then we left with a situation driven by both budgetary pressures created by government policies and whether the government remembers that they should be regularly considering if the current economic conditions mean that the individual marginal income tax rates should be adjusted (or the rates changed)... and there are many periods in our history that would suggest that the government's memories are not strong.

If taxpayers cannot rely on the government to return this additional tax through indexing these thresholds and so are left to rely on the government to be continually assessing if the government finances are such that this additional tax could be returned to taxpayers, then taxpayers should have a mechanism to ensure that the government is undertaking this assessment. As seen in example 3 and example 4 above, there are unindexed thresholds that have been adjusted in the past but today appear to have been forgotten.

Recommendation 4

That the government be required to, once a year, present to the parliament what the individual marginal tax thresholds would have been if they were appropriately indexed from 1 July 2025, or another appropriate date. This report should also include the amount of additional tax that is being paid by representative taxpayers at various income levels that has not been returned though either changes in thresholds or rates from 1 July 2025, or another appropriate date. This could be presented as a negative expenditure in the Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement required to be presented each year under Section 16 of the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998.


It is important to recognize that this recommendation is not designed to guilt or blame any Member of the House of Representatives or Senator. Rather, it is done to remind Members and Senators that, as our individual marginal tax thresholds are not indexed, parliament should when public finances permit return some of the bracket creep that has occurred to individuals through changes to threshold or rates.

This recommendation also will help maintain the legitimacy of and confidence in our tax system. Currently bracket creep allows taxes to increase without a government needing to announce or implement such an increase. However, when they return some or all of this bracket creep they can announce and implement such a decrease in taxation.

This obvious lack of transparency in the increases in tax that happen due to bracket creep has the potential to undermine the public's confidence in the tax system. It is easy to see taxpayers losing trust in a tax system that increases taxes by stealth every year.

Regular reporting of the amount of these increases will add appropriate transparency to these tax increases and increase the public's confidence in the tax system.


Appendix 1: International comparison of personal tax as a % of GDP




Source: OECD (2022) Global Revenue Statistics Database, OECD.Stat

Appendix 2: Australian tax revenue (all governments) mix 2022/23

Figure 5-6: Revenue categories as a percentage of total revenue, 2000-01 to 2035-36




Source: "2025-26 Medium-Term Budget Outlook: Beyond The Budget", Parliamentary Budget Office, September 2025



Source: *Australia's Tax Mix*, Parliamentary Budget Office, Budget Explainer, 14 November 2024

Appendix 3: Highest Marginal Rate v Factor of Average Wage when Highest Marginal Rate Applies



Source: OECD (2024) Global Revenue Statistics Database, OECD.Stat